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Energy HarvestingWireless Sensor Networks (EH-WSNs) represent an interesting new paradigm where individual nodes forming
a network are powered by energy sources scavenged from the surrounding environment. This technique provides numerous
advantages, but also new design challenges. Securing the communications under energy constraints represents one of these key
challenges. The amount of energy available is theoretically infinite in the long run but highly variable over short periods of time,
and managing it is a crucial aspect. In this paper we present an adaptive approach for security in multihop EH-WSNs which allows
different nodes to dynamically choose the most appropriate energy-affecting parameters such as encryption algorithm and key
size, providing in this way energy savings. In order to provide evidence of the approach’s feasibility in a real-world network, we
have designed and implemented it as extension of on-demand medium access control (ODMAC), a receiver-initiated (RI) MAC
protocol specifically designed and developed to address the foundational energy-related needs of Energy Harvesting Wireless
Sensor Networks.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are more and more per-
vasive, consistently used to perform many different kinds
of monitoring tasks, ranging all the way from outdoor
surveillance to body area networks. The classic means of
operation for sensor nodes have been batteries; nevertheless
thanks to technological advancements Energy Harvesting
Wireless Sensor Networks (EH-WSNs) are quickly becoming
a reality. In this scenario, nodes are able to obtain the energy
required to operate from the surrounding environment.
Different energy sources can be used, with some being more
efficient and prominent than others, but the key idea is that
the theoretical infinite lifespan of EH-WSN poses unique
challenges as nodes can run for a much longer period of
time, allowing for more permanent instalment and new
use scenarios. Furthermore, EH-WSNs are characterized by
spatial inconsistencies: depending on the particular source
of energy being scavenged it is not uncommon to find com-
pletely different energy situation between different portions
of the network, independent of their physical correlation.
For example, imagine a solar-powered EH-WSN with nodes
lying on either side of a wall. The nodes might be well in
range and able to communicate, but depending on the time
of day one side of the network could be in the shadows and
unable to harvest energy. Depending on the topology and the
application being run, this might impact availability or even
disconnect the network.
Given their use in critical situations, WSNs require solid
and reliable security capabilities. For this reason, security
research on wireless sensor networks (WSNs) has flourished
over the past years. However, the introduction of energy
harvesting capabilities represents a game changing scenario
which has yet to be fully researched. Previous WSNs tech-
nologies may not work for the EH-WSNs paradigm and new
specifically tailored solutions need to be designed in order to
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take full advantage of what energy harvesting can offer, for
instance, concerning security [1].
TheNeed for Adaptive Security.The building block of security
mechanisms forWSNs is encryption schemes. Independently
from the specific application, what normally happens is
that the data channel is made confidential and/or authentic
through the use of encryption schemes and related modes of
operation. The typical family of algorithms used with sensor
nodes are symmetric encryption algorithms since they are
considerably less expensive in terms of energy requirements
when compared to public key encryption schemes [2]. Differ-
ent algorithms have different energy requirements and while
some of these are connected to how good and optimized the
actual implementation is, a considerable portion is intrinsic
to the specific algorithm. It is logical to expect that a block
cipher with a block size of 128 bits will require more CPU
cycles than an algorithmwith a block size of 64 bits in order to
perform similar operations. A similar point can be made for
the key size of an algorithm; a longer key is bound to produce
higher energy requirements, despite the fact that it should
also increase the complexity of the cryptanalysis and the
robustness of the cipher-text. For this reason, when energy
is a big concern, having to commit to a specific algorithm is
going to be a suboptimal decision. In an energy harvesting
(EH) scenario, a specific scheme can be inadequate in differ-
ent ways: for example, it could be too expensive in terms of
energy and cause thewhole system to delay sending newmes-
sages until enough energy has been gathered. Within a net-
work with heterogeneousmessages, a given scheme could not
meet the security requirements for a particular type of mes-
sage, while it could be more than enough for a different type.
Contribution and Outline of the Paper. In this paper we
discuss and propose an adaptive security scheme that allows
each node to autonomously and independently choose the
most suitable security algorithm to use for a given link of
the network and for a given energy configuration. The idea
is that each node can advertise all the different supported
schemes and dynamically adjust them, depending on the
current energy situation. To make the approach concrete, we
have built our solution on on-demand medium access con-
trol (ODMAC) [3], a receiver-initiated (RI) medium access
control (MAC) protocol specifically designed and developed
to address the foundational needs of EH-WSN. Indeed,
ODMAC messages are sent in clear and there is no control
over their authenticity, allowing an attacker to eavesdrop the
communication, intercept messages, and forge new ones.The
goal has been to extendODMACwith adaptive security while
still maintaining a low-resource profile, keeping the protocol
suitable for EH-WSNs.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briefly
introduce ODMAC. Then in Section 3 we extend ODMAC
with an adaptive security suite. We discuss implementation
and experiments in Section 4 and we focus on some energy
and security considerations in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7
close the paper with related works and conclusions, respec-
tively.
2. ODMAC Protocol
The key feature ODMAC provides in order to support EH-
WSN is to allow each node to independently choose its own
duty-cycle (DC) and adjust it according to different param-
eters like the harvesting rate of a node or the requirements
of the application [3, 4]. Thanks to that, a trade-off between
power and performance can be obtained. For example, in
case of scarce energy the DC can be decreased to give time
to the node to harvest more and gather enough to survive a
communication.On the other hand,when energy is abundant
the DC can be increased and as a result also the performance
of the network will increase: more packets exchanged will
translate to increased throughput and decreased delay.
To achieve this, the protocol relies on the RI paradigm
[5], which not only has proven to be more energy efficient
than its counterpart sender-initiated (SI) [6], but also is a
goodmatch forDC adaptation. A node runningODMAChas
two different DCs, one for exchanging messages and one for
sensing purposes. These two DCs are, respectively, called the
beaconing and the sensing duty-cycle.
As the name of the paradigm suggests, the message
transmission starts from the receiver (Figure 1). Whenever
a beaconing period elapses and a node 𝑟 ready to receive
data enters the active state, it will perform a clear channel
assessment (CCA) to determine whether or not there is an
ongoing transmission already happening. If the channel is
available, 𝑟will transmit a beacon 𝑏manifesting its intentions
to receive a packet and it will then start to listen to the channel
for incoming packets for a fixed amount of time.
Similarly, when a sender 𝑠 enters the active state because
a sensing event has occurred, it will start listening to the
channel for an appropriate beacon. This is a beacon that
satisfies specific predefined conditions such as moving the
packet closer to its destination. Should such a beacon be
received 𝑠 will immediately transmit its packet and go into
sleep mode. In the upcoming wake-ups, 𝑠 waits for a new
beacon from 𝑟which will work as an acknowledgment (ACK)
for the packet sent previously.
Whenever data is received by a node, if the node itself is
not the final recipient (as it will happenmost of the times in a
multihop network), a forwarding procedurewill begin.This is
identical to the sensing and transmission operation described
above, with the exception that, instead of being generated
locally, data is obtained from another node.
Since ODMAC has specifically been designed for EH-
WSNs, its guiding design principle is sustainability. More
specifically, a node adapts its DCs to remain operational with
the current energy situation, aiming to achieve an energy
neutral operation (ENO) state [7].The concept of ENO refers
to a state where the energy consumed by a node is always less
than or equal to the energy harvested from the environment.
This state guarantees infinite lifetime as soon as there are not
any hardware failures. The way this is obtained is through
a feedback loop where a node is able to monitor its current
energy level and initiate a communication when the value is
high enough.
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Figure 1: ODMAC described as a finite state machine.
ODMAC provides many advanced features that makes
the protocol specifically suitable for EH-WSNs, such as oppor-
tunistic forwarding, altruistic backoff, and layer-based anycast
routing. Introducing all these features is outside the scope
of the paper. Interested readers can refer to the ODMAC
literature [3, 4, 8, 9] for all the design and implementation
details.
3. Extending ODMAC with Adaptive Security
The key limitation of ODMAC and, as a consequence, of
the resulting ODMAC-based network is that it does not
provide any security suite. Even the key security services like
confidentiality, integrity, and availability are not provided by
ODMAC. This means that messages are sent in clear and
there is no control over their authenticity, allowing an attacker
to eavesdrop the communication, intercept messages, and
forge new ones. Thus, the goal is to extend ODMAC in
order to achieve much better security properties while still
maintaining a low-resource profile and remaining suitable for
EH-WSNs. The key approach to achieve this goal is adaptive
security.
3.1. Modes of Operation. We have extended ODMAC by
developing a security suite inspired by TinySec [10]. The
security suite has four modes of operation: no security,
authentication, encryption, and authentication + encryption
which can be chosen on a per-message basis, allowing for full
customization from the user. When both authentication and
encryption are chosen, they are composed using the secure
encrypt-then-MAC paradigm [11].
The scheme supports encryption algorithms with 64-
bit blocks and 80-bit or 128-bit keys. In our proof of
concept implementation we have used Skipjack [12] which
requires 20 B of RAM and around 6.5 KiB of ROM. Despite
its age, Skipjack continues to prove secure for an 80-bit
key algorithm [13]; the most successful attack so far is
an impossible differential attack on 31 of the 32 rounds
yielding a result marginally faster than exhaustive search [14].
Considering that the National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) has proposed to phase out the use of
80-bit keys by 2015, it is a good idea to turn the attention
to algorithms supporting 128-bit keys. Depending on the
application and the implementation, different ciphers can be
used [15]. Piccolo [16] and TWINE [17] are good candidates
for software implementations, respectively, requiring 91 B and
23 B of RAM and 2.5 KiB and 2.2 KiB of ROM. For hardware
implementation the best candidate is PRESENT [18] which
uses 1886-gate equivalent (GE) and has also been included
in the standard for lightweight cryptographic methods by the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [19].
Encryption is carried out using cipher block chaining
(CBC) mode with cipher-text stealing to avoid last block
message expansion, while authentication is done with cipher
block chaining message authentication code (CBC-MAC).
This allows using one encryption algorithm to perform both
operations. It is important to highlight that a key for the
system in authentication + encryptionmode is actually a pair
of keys, one for each operation. Authentication codes and
encryption are checked and recomputed at each hop. This
has the advantage of intercepting maliciously or fortuitously
malformed packets as early as possible, avoiding the waste of
energy to route them to their final destination only to discard
them there.
A possible extension to the scheme is to use an authenti-
cated encryption (AE)mode.The advantage of this technique
is that it is possible to obtain both authentication and
encryption at the same time, without having to run the
algorithm twice. The highest performance algorithms are
offset codebook (OCB) (used in MiniSec [20]) and Galois
counter mode (GCM), with the former having the better
performance [21]. Unfortunately OCB is patented and could
not be used freely until recently (9 January 2013), when a
free license has been issued for open-source noncommercial
application. The algorithm is still not free for commercial
applications. The other mode, GCM, is notoriously cum-
bersome to implement correctly. A comparison between
different implementations in TinySec can be found in [22]
where CBC and GCM are analyzed in conjunction with both
the advanced encryption standard (AES) and Skipjack. The
results show that GCM in combination with AES obtains
a 12% increase in energy consumption, a 28% increase in
RAM usage, and a 35% decrease in throughput compared
to the original implementation of TinySec. While constantly
outperforming CBC in combination with AES, it is still
a considerable decrease in performance, justifiable only if
the application requires both authentication and encryption
without any differentiation.
3.2. Adaptive Security Scheme. The key feature the scheme
provides is to allow each node of the network to indepen-
dently choose the best compromise between security and
energy consumption according to different metrics. This
scheme is inspired by [23]. However, differently from that,
we allow dynamic multihop communication, making the
approach more suitable to concrete, real-world scenarios.
A WSN is characterized by nodes producing and
exchanging packets. Upon creation, each packet𝑝
𝑖
is assigned
a security value ℎ
𝑝𝑖
:= 𝐻(𝑝
𝑖
), where 𝐻 : 𝑃 → 𝐸 × 𝐴
is a function mapping elements from the set of possible
packets 𝑃 to tuples representing security configurations.This
function assesses the criticality of a specific packet. We will
abstract from its implementation, but it could be thought as
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a direct connection between specific parameters of a packet
and importance values. For example, packets representing
aggregate values could be considered more important than
single measurements, or potentially harmful control packets
(e.g., a message asking to reduce the transmission power)
would be rated higher than regular messages.
As described before, the ℎ values are tuples (𝑒, 𝑎) ∈ 𝐸×𝐴,
where each component directly translates into a specific secu-
rity configuration of encryption and authorization, respec-
tively. Different values aremapped to different algorithms and
parameters. This mapping can be decided at design-time of
the specific network application. An example can be seen in
Table 1, where we describe only encryption modes assuming
tuples of the form (𝑒, 0). Another possible demonstration
can be the default security protocol list of 802.15.4 [24,
Table 75], which comprises encryption, authentication, and
authenticated encryption.
The protocol relies heavily on the RI paradigm; whenever
a receiver node 𝑟 transmits a beacon, it will include its security
capabilities 𝑐𝑡
𝑟,max and 𝑐
𝑡
𝑟,min; these are, respectively, the highest
ℎ tuple that 𝑟 can satisfy and the lowest ℎ tuple that 𝑟 will
accept, at time 𝑡. A sender node 𝑠 can then analyze beacons
to check if both the destination and the security capabilities
of its owner are satisfactory. Assuming a total ordering on the
security capabilities, let 𝑟 be the final recipient for node 𝑠 (e.g.,
the base station) and Δ(𝑢, V) the function that measures the
distance in number of hops between two nodes 𝑢 and V; then
a beacon 𝑏 from node 𝑟 is considered adequate for packet 𝑝
𝑖
if and only if Δ(𝑟, 𝑟) < Δ(𝑠, 𝑟) ∧ 𝑐𝑡
𝑟,min ≤ ℎ𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑐
𝑡
𝑟,max, that is,
if the distance between 𝑝
𝑖
and its final destination 𝑟 decreases
by sending 𝑝
𝑖
to 𝑟 and 𝑟 can satisfy the security requirements
of 𝑝
𝑖
. Note that we use a strict inequality for the distance
to account for ODMAC opportunistic forwarding [4], where
beacons moving a message closer to the final destination of
the packet are still considered adequate even if they could be
suboptimal from a routing standpoint.
The pseudocode for data transmission and reception
can be seen in Algorithms 1 and 2. The key point of these
algorithms is the generation of the 𝑐 values (lines 1.5, 1.6, 2.6,
and 2.7). These values are tightly connected to the amount
of energy available in a node and to the security policies
of the system. The notion of available energy is something
constantly varying, especially in EH-WSNs. Itmay be the case
that a node has only enough energy to run in (No Security, No
Security) mode at the current time. However, that situation
might improve after it has been able to scavenge some more
energy. On the other hand security policies can impose both
static and dynamic values according to the specific type of
application. In the rest of the section, we will show through
some examples how different scenarios can be accommo-
dated by adapting how security values are generated. Before
that, it is important to stress another point concerning the
sensitivity of the data to be transmitted. Indeed, the level of
sensitivity of the information belongs to the application logic
of the node. In other words, our framework provides the
possibility for the node to choose among different security
levels. It is then up to the application logic to decide which
security level is appropriate for a specific message, according
to the data to be sent and the energy available. For instance,
Table 1: An example of the𝐻-security mapping.
𝐻(𝑥) Encryption Authentication
(0, 0) No No
(1, 0)
Skipjack
(key size 80 bits, block size 64 bits) No
(2, 0)
HIGHT
(key size 128 bits, block size 64 bits) No
(3, 0)
AES128
(key size 128 bits, block size 128 bits) No
(1) function send data(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡)
(2) Packet p
(3) Beacon b
(4) p.𝑖𝑑 ← self .𝑖𝑑
(5) p.𝑒 ← set enc capabilities()
(6) p.𝑎 ← set auth capabilities()
(7) p.𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 ← pack data(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎)
(8) repeat
(9) b←wait for beacon()
(10) until Δ(b.𝑖𝑑, 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡) < Δ(p.𝑖𝑑, 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡) AND
(11) b.𝑒min ≤ p.𝑒 ≤ b.𝑒max AND
(12) b.𝑎min ≤ p.𝑎 ≤ b.𝑎max
(13) transmit(p, b.𝑖𝑑)
(14) end function
Algorithm 1: Adaptive security data transmission.
(1) function receive data()
(2) Packet p
(3) Beacon b
(4) b.𝑖𝑑 ← self .𝑖𝑑
(5) repeat
(6) (b.𝑒min, b.𝑒max) ← set enc capabilities()
(7) (b.𝑎min, b.𝑎max) ← set auth capabilities()
(8) transmit(b)
(9) p←wait for packet()
(10) until p ̸= nil
(11) 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 ← unpack data(p.𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎)
(12) return 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
(13) end function
Algorithm 2: Adaptive security data reception.
if the information waiting to be transmitted is not sensitive,
then the node can adopt the (No Security, No Security)mode
for that transmission, independently of the energy available
(which could allow for a better security level).
Static Configuration.The first scenario can be used to under-
stand how our scheme works at its core. Senders generate
𝑐 values for outgoing packets according to the amount of
energy available to the node at time of creation, using a
lookup-table to match security configurations and energy
requirements. A simple definition of this routine can be seen
in Algorithm 3; note that here the sender is not taking into
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(1) function set enc capabilities()
(2) 𝐸 ← get current energy()
(3) return 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒[𝐸]
(4) end function
Algorithm 3: Encryption capabilities generation in static configu-
ration.
account the criticality of the data to choose the security
configuration but rather is using a “best effort” kind of
strategy. At the same time, the receiving side of each node is
statically assigned security ranges. As a result the system can
be seen as a weighted directed graph where an edge from 𝑢 to
V of cost 𝑐 means that 𝑢 can communicate to V (is physically
in range), but only provided that it uses the security features
represented by 𝑐. The way to obtain this behavior is to set 𝑐min
and 𝑐max to the same value. By doing this a receiver can decide
the security class of the packets to accept.
Dynamic Configuration. The static configuration is good for
describing how themodelworks; however its utility is limited.
An extension is presented in the dynamic configuration.
WSNs often cover large geographical areas such as forests
or fields. It could be the case that treating the whole area
as a single zone with some fixed properties is not the
best approximation. Imagine an example where a network
is deployed in an area covering two different buildings
connected by an open space. It is sensible to believe that
the nodes inside the buildings will be susceptible to fewer
risks compared to the nodes out in the open. For this reason,
in dynamic configuration, we allow the node at each hop
to reconfigure the ℎ value of a packet, increasing it when
moving towards a less secure zone or decreasing it when
moving away from such a zone. Here the sender has also to
address the importance of the packet as part of the process,
making sure that important packets are not underprotected
which would result in a security issue or that less important
packets are not overprotected leading to a waste of energy.
Similarly to senders, receivers can adapt their advertised 𝑐
values depending on the specific area they are in and the
amount of energy currently available.The pseudocode for the
𝑐 values generation in this case can be seen in Algorithm 4.
As a result, a more fine-grained approximation of the
area can be achieved, allowing a more conscious use of the
available energy.
Path Configuration. A third way for tailoring our scheme
to a specific application is by using path configuration.
Here the idea is to force packets through specific paths by
carefully choosing the 𝑐min values advertised by the receivers.
Assuming that multiple paths are available to one destination
and that the ℎ value of a packet is related only to its
importance, a receiver can dynamically choose to accept
different types of packet by adjusting the value of 𝑐min. For
example, imagine that we would like the network in Figure 2
to route all the packets containing aggregate measurements
through nodes 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐, whereas we do not care where
(1) function set enc capabilities()
(2) 𝐸 ← get current energy()
(3) 𝑍 ← get zone id()
(4) 𝑐 ← 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒[𝐸]
(5) if 𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑍) then
(6) 𝑐 ← 𝑐 + 𝑥
(7) end if
(8) return 𝑐
(9) end function
Algorithm 4: Encryption capabilities generation in dynamic con-
figuration.
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Figure 2: Example of how routing can be affected in path configura-
tion. The high security packets will be sent through nodes 𝑎, 𝑏, and
𝑐, while the low security ones will travel through 𝑒 and 𝑓.
singlemeasurements packets are routed.This can be achieved
by setting 𝑐min to (3, 3) in 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 and to (1, 1) in the
remaining nodes. We also have to make sure that aggregate
packets are assigned ℎ values of at least (3, 3) and they will be
picked up only by nodes 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 as wanted. Furthermore,
the values advertised by receivers can be again dynamically
varied according to the situation of the network. For example,
if nodes 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 become unavailable for a period of time,
other nodes can take over their duties by increasing their
own 𝑐min to accept aggregated packets. Another possibility is
to dynamically react to a localized attack (e.g., jamming) by
redirecting traffic to a safe area of the network.
Discussion. The configurations provided above are meant to
be examples and guidelines on how the scheme itself can be
adapted to different scenarios and application requirements
and are by no means meant to be exhaustive. Having the pos-
sibility to modify the behaviour of both senders and receivers
allows for considerable flexibility, enabling the design of
solutions that are tailored to the problem at hand and hence
can guarantee good performances. For instance, imagine an
application where delay is a main concern; that is, packets
should arrive from the nodes to the base station as quickly
as possible. In this scenario, waiting for a beacon advertising
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Figure 3: Fully secured packet format for ODMAC. An authentication code is added at the end of both types of message, and the data field
is also encrypted.
the best energy to security ratio costs precious time. It is
instead possible to have nodes try to send packets using the
first useful beacon, regardless of its security parameters.
At the other side of the spectrum we could have an
application where security is the main focus. Here each node
could keep track of the security configuration advertised
through different beacons and only use the best seen so far to
relaymessages, possibly using a weight function that provides
diminishing returns according to how old a packet is.
4. Implementation and Experimental Results
We implemented the ODMAC security suite, as an extension
of the ODMAC implementation presented in [4], on
the eZ430 platform by Texas Instruments. For space
limitations, we will focus only on the security aspects of the
implementation and interested readers can refer to [4] for
more details on the ODMAC implementation. The ODMAC
security suite incorporated some modification to the
transmission routines, but it is generally transparent to the
user which only has to set the desiredmode.When a packet is
created and about to be sent, it is first encrypted (if required)
and then authenticated (again, if required). The well-known
advantage of applying those transformations in this order
is that integrity of the cipher-text is provided and, as a
consequence, also integrity of the plain-text. Furthermore, it
is not possible to maliciously modify the cipher-text so that
it will be decrypted to some other (meaningful) plain-text,
and finally assuming that the output of the encryption will
appear to be random, so will the result of the cryptographic
message authentication code (CMAC), preventing structural
information from leaking through.
When a message is received the opposite procedure is
performed. First of all, the CMAC is verified; if there is
a mismatch the message will be discarded and the node
informed with a corresponding error. This prevents mal-
formed messages from having an impact on the whole
network by being forwarded to other nodes, causing them to
spend unnecessary energy in the process. Once themessage is
authenticated it will be decrypted and the normal behaviour
of the node will continue. The packet format for the highest
security mode (authentication and encryption) is shown in
Figure 3.
Several experiments on ODMAC can be found in lit-
erature [3, 4], covering different EH-WSN scenarios. Our
experiments are meant to complement those experiments by
focusing on ODMAC security. From this perspective, we are
particularly interested in showing the impact of the security
suite. To this aim, let us consider a scenario where two
kinds of packets are available to a sender node: low security
and high security ones. Low security packets will be sent
unencrypted, whereas high security ones must be encrypted
and authenticated. Whenever possible we give precedence
to high security packets, meaning that if enough energy is
available an encrypted and authenticated message will be
sent. An unsecured message will be sent otherwise.
For the experiment we used a single link with a transmit-
ter that is powered through photovoltaic cells using the CBC-
EVAL-09 platform. In a controlled environment, we supply
the system with a constant level of illumination. In parallel,
we feed the voltage of the output capacitor of CBC-EVAL-
09 to the analog-to-digital converter of eZ430, effectively
making energy-aware. In this setting, we define two voltage
levels.The normal behavior of the sender node would then be
the following: upon waking up it would check the capacitor
value; if the value is above the higher threshold the node
would send a high security packet, if the value is between
the high and the low thresholds the node would send a low
security packet, and if the value is below the low threshold
the node would go back to sleep. A wake-up event, that is, a
packet transmission attempt, is scheduled at a period of 10 s.
We first run a control experiment only sending low secu-
rity packets, thus disabling the security overhead. Afterwards,
we have run the full experiment with both thresholds. Both
experiments lasted for 90 minutes and are summarized in
Figure 4. In the control case we were able to send 525 packets,
averaging 0.097 packets/s (0.97 packets/10 s). This value is
very close to the theoretical limit of 1.00 packet/10 s. For the
full-blown experiment we managed to transmit 486 packets
over the entire duration, 397 of which were high security
(encrypted and authenticated), while the remaining 89 were
low security. As a result we achieved a cumulative average
of 0.090 packets/s (0.90 packets/10 s) and an average rate of
0.073 packets/s (0.73 packets/10 s) for high security packets
only. Despite having added more functionalities and tight-
ened the energy requirement by increasing the transmission
threshold, we were able to maintain similar performances.
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Figure 4:The adaptive, security-enabled scheme has tighter energy
requirements but shows a decrease in packets sent of only 7.42%.
Observe that since the two scenarios used the exact same
energy budgets, we can infer the actual power overhead
of the security system; transmitting a high security packet
consumes on average 9.8% more energy than a low security
packet. This demonstrates the significance of an adaptive
security system from a different perspective. Based on this
estimation, if we blindly use the highest security, also for
packets that do not require it, we would be able to transmit
only 478 packets, that is, 8 packets less.
5. Energy and Security Considerations
In this section we will provide some considerations on the
scheme in general, including how it is possible to obtain
the different information required by the protocol and some
considerations on the security guarantees of our scheme.
5.1. Energy Management. Each node has to be aware of the
current state of charge (SOC) of its main battery to decide
which security values to advertise through beacons. This can
be realized with different methods, the most common being
Voltage Based Estimation andCoulombCounting. In the first
method it is possible to directly measure the voltage across
the battery and relate this to the actual SOC by means of
the discharge characteristics relative to the specific chemistry
process used within the cell. For this method to achieve
reasonable accuracy, compensation factors for temperature,
cell age, and discharge rate should be factored in, making it
slightly less practical forWSNs.With Coulomb Counting the
idea is to consider the battery as a closed system containing a
given amount of charge, when full, and subtracting from this
value as the battery depletes. In order to measure the actual
current drawn from the battery different sensing techniques
such as shunt resistors or hall effect sensors can be used.
To correctly assess the cost of a specific configuration it is
required to measure the amount of energy needed in order to
use it. This can be done empirically, by measuring the state of
charge of the battery before and after a large enough number
of transmissions and then computing the average in offline
experiments.
Once these quantities are known, it is possible for a node
to correctly advertise the currently supported configurations.
As the state of charge varies over time, less or more configu-
rations will become available and the newly created beacons
will reflect the situation adaptively changing the supported
features.This is where RI protocols shine: thanks to their core
mechanic it is extremely easy to convey information from the
sender to the receiver before the actual packet is sent, without
having to perform unnecessary communications.The sender
can then use this information to decide whether or not the
receiver is appropriate.
5.2. Security Considerations. Possible attacks to this protocol
are closely related to the underlying MAC protocol and
the encryption algorithms used. Without touching on the
security of the individual algorithms, which is out of the
scope of this work, we now analyze what a potential adversary
might be able to achieve bymanipulatingmessages within the
network and taking advantage of the protocol innerworkings.
This analysis ties into the correct design of the system and
can help define security properties according to the required
features. For the adversary model in this section we will
consider a Dolev-Yao attacker [25] which is aware of the
protocol and is able to eavesdrop, intercept, and create new
messages using the knowledge accumulated over time.
A first concern is about forging beacons. This would
allow the adversary to advertise incorrect security capabilities
or malicious routing information in the form or wrong
identities. This problem is avoided by ensuring that either an
encryption or an authentication layer is always present. The
attacker would have to share a key with other nodes in order
to be able to communicate fresh messages with them. This
argument relies on the secrecy and the strength of the key,
which is in line with the attacker model. If, for example, poor
key exchange mechanisms are used within the application
and the adversary can get hold of the key, the security of the
scheme is obviously defeated.
It is worth pointing out that while using either authen-
tication or encryption provides the same upshot (packets
cannot be forged), the way this is obtained is slightly different.
In case of encryption we can say that, in order to create a
counterfeit beacon, the adversary should produce a key that
would allow him to create packets that would be correctly and
meaningfully decrypted by recipients nodes; in other words
he would have to have a shared key with all the target nodes.
The number of such keys depends on the keying scheme
used: single-key, probabilistic, group-based, or pairwise, just
to name a few.
On the other hand, in the authentication case, the
adversary would have to produce a key that can validate the
content of the message against a tag appended at the end of
the message itself, proving that the identity of the owner of
the message is legitimate. This is a separate key that can be
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managed in a completely different way from the other one; for
example, it could be a single key which once compromised
gives the possibility to exchange authentic messages with
every other node within the network.
Furthermore, if the system allows nodes to dynamically
join the network, it becomes much harder to discover an
attacker that tries to disguise himself as a regular node,
complies to the protocol long enough to establish a genuine
identity, and then goes rogue. The result of this is that
while both systems guarantee the freshness of a message, the
decision of which is better suited to deal with the problem,
as often happens, lies in the details like the key management
scheme used.
A second possible course of action for the adversary
is to try and spoof or modify received beacons in order
to retransmit them at a later time. This is avoided by
using authentication schemes which, by definition, prevent
messages from being modified. In other words, by using
security suites like our scheme presented in Section 3 both
integrity and confidentiality are achieved.
Since the adaptive scheme is based upon EH, energy
exploitation must be carefully taken into account. While an
attacker with physical access to the node could in theory
prevent it from recharging and keeping it in a low security
state, we believe this is not an effective attack. First of all if an
attacker has physical access to a node, energy exploitation is
not the main concern, but rather the node could be cloned
or reprogrammed or have secret keys extracted from it, all
kinds of attacks that would cause much greater harm to the
whole network. Secondly if the attacker wants to have some
kind of distributed effect on the network by changing the
current energy parameters, he must do so for a considerable
number of nodes, and, depending on the actual network size
and the kind of energy used to power the nodes, this could be
unfeasible.
Finally, one more concern is about replayed beacons. As
we have discussed previously, this technique can be used
to impersonate another entity, carrying out communications
on behalf of the entity and trying to gain some advantage
from it. Depending on how this is done, it is possible to
force senders to use lower than necessary security settings in
order to obtain cryptographic advantage or to force higher
than necessary security settings, thus making nodes use
more energy for each message exchange and shortening their
active time, possibly causing a denial of service. Other ways
of performing this kind of attack are similar in principle
but are a bit more subtle; for example, an adversary could
monitor the traffic looking for nodes important to the specific
application, like nodes forwarding traffic in a high security
path, nodes with a high incoming degree (topology bottle-
necks), or nodes performing critical measurements. Once
such potential targets have been identified, the attacker can
then use a series of replayed messages in order to selectively
disrupt the victims. A solution to this issue can be found
in receiver authentication protocol (RAP) [26], the scheme
which specifically targets the beacon replay attack. RAP can
be used on top of any security mode and can be factored into
the design of the system.
6. Related Work
Adaptive security is not a brand new concept. The work
in [23] uses a similar environment and a similar approach,
additionally focusing on priority, but limited to single-hop
networks with carrier sense multiple access (CSMA). The
authors say that, rather than achieving an absolute decrease
in energy consumption, they manage to obtain a trade-off
among consumed energy, importance of the packets sent, and
their security.
Another example of adaptive security can be found in
[27]. Here optical wireless communications are taken into
account. The authors propose to subdivide an encryption
system 𝑆 into 𝑛 subsystems 𝑆
1
, 𝑆
2
, 𝑆
3
, . . . , 𝑆
𝑛
each one repre-
senting one encryption parameter such as key size, number
of rounds, or operation mode. The idea then is to vary those
parameters according to the security requirements or the
amount of available energy in the case of battery powered
devices.
The work in [28] is closer to static analysis. Three main
parameters are used to define the security level of a protocol:
the protection level, the probability of an attack, and the
impact of a successful attack. Concerning the protection level,
parameters such as the efficacy of an attack (provided it is
successful), the knowledge required to mount it, its cost,
the communication overhead, and the complexity of the
implementation are considered. Similarly, the impact of a
successful attack is calculated according to the financial losses
during the attack, the cost for recovering from the attack, and
the losses in reputation suffered by the owners of the system.
Finally, the probability of an attack is assumed to be given.
These values are composed to obtain a single security level.
Individual security mechanism is then analyzed and defined
in terms of complexity and power consumption. Ultimately,
according to the system specifications, the required security
capabilities, and the provided cost functions, specific security
parameters are chosen and the system is run accordingly.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have proposed an adaptive approach for
security in multihop Energy Harvesting Wireless Sensor
Networks (EH-WSNs). The rationale behind the approach
is to allow each node to autonomously and independently
choose the most suitable encryption/authentication algo-
rithm to use for a given link of the network and for a given
energy configuration.The idea is that each node can advertise
all the different supported schemes and dynamically adjust
them, depending on the current energy situation. In order
to provide evidence of the scheme’s feasibility in a real-world
network, we have designed and implemented it as extension
of ODMAC [3, 4], a RI MAC protocol specifically designed
and developed to address the foundational energy-related
needs of EH-WSN. Our experimental analysis suggests that
the energy consumption overhead of the system is 9.8%,while
demonstrating that an adaptive solution is performing better
than blindly providing the highest security.
Although the proposed scheme has been implemented as
extension of ODMAC, from a design perspective the security
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scheme is independent of the specific class/family of MAC
protocols adopted (in the case of this paper, RI MAC
protocols [5]). This means that our scheme can be adapted to
work also with the other important class of MAC protocols,
namely, sender-initiated (SI) MAC protocols. This represents
our key future work.
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